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Once upon a time economic historians searched for industrial revolutions.  
Now they scout the past for information revolutions.  They have found many:  in 
Victorian England, eighteenth century Sicily, ancien régime Paris, the early modern 
Atlantic, the ancient world.1  But what do we mean by information?   
Economics treats information as rational knowledge that guides action, a 
definition that goes back to the nineteenth century.  In the twentieth century, 
information lost many of these older Enlightenment connotations.  In 1948  Bell 
Labs engineer Claude Shannon synthesized theories of information as any 
transmission that reduced uncertainty and resolved ambiguous states.2  A letter, 
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  On information in the past generally see Naomi Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin. 
"Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History," American 
Historical Review 108 (April 2003): 404-33.  John J. McCusker, “The Demise of Distance:  The Business 
Press and the Origins of the Information Revolution in the Early Modern Atlantic World,” American 
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modern world, see Carlo Belfanti, “Guilds, Patents, and the Circulation of Technical Knowledge:  
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ancient past, see Peter Temin, “Financial Intermediation in the Early Roman Empire,” Journal of 
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2 Bernard D. Geoghegan, “The Historiographic Conceptualization of Information:  A Critical Survey,”  
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telegram, email, and for that matter, novel, painting and sculpture were reduced to 
media of communication trying to convey an idea or message.  There need be 
nothing inherently rational in the content of these signals.  Nor did the subjective 
experiences of the communicator and receiver matter.  These became merely 
“noise” interfering with the intended message.3  This stripped down theory is not 
wrong, but it is incomplete.  It hides the architecture of knowledge needed to give 
bare facts meaning.  It ignores such matters as disinformation, propaganda, lies, 
slander, gossip and irony—in other words, quite a bit of human communication. 
Economists usually think of information as clear signals that have meanings 
all parties understand. 4 A turn signal on a car works because we know what a 
blinking light on the back of an automobile means (at least that’s the theory).  Lack 
of understanding indicates poor information.  But information can also be conceived 
of as a sign.  Signs have unstable meanings; their states cannot be resolved by simply 
adding more signs.  Instead, they must be interpreted through some system of 
meaning.5  The economics of information largely ignores hermeneutics, or the 
problem of interpretation.6 
                                                 
3 Herbert Simon was particularly influential in introducing this concept of information to economics 
and management.  Hunter Heyck, Herbert A. Simon:  The Bounds of Reason in Modern America (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
4  Kenneth Lipartito, “Business Culture,” in Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Business History, (Oxford University  Press, 2008), 620.  On how information systems 
construct meaning see Jeffrey Fear, Organizing Control:  August Thyssen and the Construction of 
German Corporate Management (Harvard University Press. 2005), appendix A and also introduction. 
5 Shannon’s information theory looks only at the quality of the channel and does not deal with 
semantics.  Friedrich Hayek argued that markets provide clear signals to actors,  But Hayek also 
argued that entrepreneurs are skilled actors, whose tacit knowledge is crucial to economic growth 
and efficiency.  If prices are merely one dimensional signals, then creative entrepreneurship is 
unnecessary and innovation impossible.  If entrepreneurs have tacit skills and knowledge and are 
capable of innovation, then prices must be more like signs, subject to reading and interpretation. 
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The problem of meaning, and the limitations of standard information theory 
more broadly, brings us to surveillance.  Surveillance denotes the means and 
methods of extracting, organizing, stabilizing, interpreting and circulating 
information.  Although it is not itself an act of interpretation, it is a system of 
organizing information in a prescribed manner to yield meanings.  The meanings 
constructed, however, are not neutral and universal—they are strategic.  In its 
primary definition, surveillance means observation or knowledge of someone, but 
with the strong connotation of control.  One conducts surveillance on another (a one 
way, rather than reciprocal act) for some purpose or objective.  The observer 
decides what counts, what is recorded, and how it will be used.  Traditional 
economic thinking assumes simply that more and better information yields 
transparent, equal economic relationships.  In this way surveillance should 
eliminate informational asymmetry between parties, prevent opportunism and 
increase exchange.  But surveillance may do the opposite, making relations less 
symmetrical, putting up a one way rather than transparent screen, allowing one 
party to exploit another. 
Consider a thought experiment.  Through exacting surveillance one person 
gains perfect knowledge of another, who has absolutely no information on the first.  
The informed party has tremendous advantage in any exchange, even to the point of 
revealing just those things the uninformed wants to hear.  In another context, this 
                                                                                                                                                 
 F. A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Sep., 
1945), 519-530. 
6 Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol,"  
Administrative Science Quarterly 26(2), 1981, pp. 171-186, discuss the reasons organizations gather 
so much information using similar ideas.  My point here accords especially with their section on 
surveillance and strategic motivations. 
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would be called a confidence game, a means of control and manipulation.  Perfect 
surveillance thus increases opportunism, allows minutely refined strategizing.  It 
may also provoke as a natural reaction resistance and counter-surveillance, as each 
party strives for informational advantage over the other.   The winner will be the 
one with the best surveillance tools.  Thus, to appreciate the effects of surveillance, 
we must ask who is seeking information on whom, for what purposes, using what 
assumptions, categories and methods to watch, observe and know. 
Surveillance has economic value because information is not a free resource 
waiting to be picked up, ready to be used.  It must be appropriated and organized if 
it is to do work—and the tools of surveillance are designed to do just these things.  
The economy of surveillance reflects the decreasing costs of watching, observing 
and gathering, storing and using information, a reduction which has been occurring 
these past hundred and fifty years or so.  This shift of the supply curve has lowered 
the cost of surveillance, and given those with access to its technology increasing 
advantage over those without.  But while the direct costs of producing information 
about people has fallen, the social costs of this activity have risen.  There are real 
consequences to living under ever refining optic of surveillance, externalities not 
captured in standard economic models.  These costs have important ramifications 







Although investigation, inquisition, interrogation, and watching, observing 
and no doubt peeping and gossiping have occurred throughout history, surveillance 
as a general, continuous, institutionalized practice is relatively new.  Only about two 
hundred years ago were lives individualized, identified and recorded in ways we 
take as routine today.  Until the seventeenth century, and much later in many parts 
of the world, people lived out their existence unseen and largely unaccounted for by 
the state, except in a few circumstances.  Much of life, even economic life, was local, 
spent in face-to-face relationships.  Although merchants and traders constructed 
more extended economic associations, these too were personal—networks of far-
flung family members, or members of the same ethnic or religious group with whom 
one could do business.  Abstract forms of knowing through written or numerical 
accounts were only partially reliable, when they were available at all, and did not 
penetrate deeply into individual lives.  The Domesday Book recorded the land 
holdings of England’s tenants-in-chief in the 11th century, but did not identify the 
majority of the population.  Even for large estates it provided few details about their 
operations.  In early modern Europe, private accounts and journals of economic 
activity were deeply embedded in the cultures of the communities that created 
them.7 
                                                 
7 V. H. Galbraith, The Making of the Domesday Book (Clarendon Press, 1961).  In creating the 
Domesday Book, a fair amount of economic detail was gathered on people, land and livestock, but 
most of this was discarded when compiled into the book itself, a significant distinction when it comes 
to surveillance.  On merchant accounts, see Daniel Rabuzzi, “Eighteenth-Century Commercial 
Mentalities as Reflected and Projected in Business Hand Books,” Eighteenth-Century Studies, 29/2 
(1995-96): 169-189; Natalie Zemon Davis, “Religion and Capitalism Once Again?  Jewish Merchant 
Culture in the Seventeenth Century,” in Sherry B. Ortner (ed.), The Fate of "Culture": Geertz and 
Beyond.  (University of California Press, 1999), 56-84.  See Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact:  
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In the eighteenth century, information practices began to change, in some 
cases dramatically.  States developed extensive apparatus for keeping track of 
populations, a consequence of territorial expansion and routine, extended economic 
relationships.  Anthony Giddens argues that modern states are vast information 
collecting, storing and sorting machines.  These capabilities, he notes, allowed them 
to increase their control across space and over time.8  They aided administrative 
practice and provided a new medium of surveillance by allowing the encoding, 
storage and retrieval of data in new ways--through lists, dossiers, files.  As the 
techniques of surveillance grow, states are able to penetrate more deeply into the 
day-to-day lives of people.9   
Michel Foucault also finds the modern state connected to surveillance, 
though in a somewhat different manner.  Where Giddens sees a growing capacity for 
external monitoring of people, Foucault emphasizes internalization, through  new 
disciplinary institutions that regulate subjects into good citizens, workers, patients 
and pupils.  Though discipline is internalized, surveillance is necessary to the 
process.  Thus the master metaphor of the Panopticon, Bentham’s utopian prison.  
Inmates never know when they are under the gaze of the warder.  This uncertainty 
forces them to internalize the moral code of good behavior.  Where Giddens stresses 
                                                                                                                                                 
Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago, 1998), 29-65 on how 
accounting came to represent accuracy and regulate credit in the early modern period.  
8  Giddens follows in the tradition of Harold Innis, who argued that light media—paper, electrical 
signals—are easily moved and conveyed, and thus permit a greater geographical span of control.  
Messages written on paper, for example, can be carried throughout the empire, in ways that 
messages written on stone cannot.  Harold Innis, Empire and Communications (University of Toronto, 
1974); The Bias of Communications (University of Toronto, 1951).  
9 Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Berkeley, 1983), 91-97. 
Modern states using surveillance methods can develop a level of control approaching totalitarianism, 
something not possible even in the most despotic of old regimes. 
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continuous monitoring and recording of behavior, Foucault observes that, 
“surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action.”10   
Foucault also emphasizes the expressive potential of surveillance, in contrast 
to Gidden’s focus on state monopoly of violence.  Humans are shaped in accord with 
structures of knowledge and claims of truth, and not merely repressed.  This too 
requires surveillance—to segment, categorize, rank, and separate individuals, so as 
to construct “an analytical grid that allows comparison, experimentation and 
intervention.”  These micro technologies of power, Foucault argues, are most 
effective when they are small, discreet and incremental, operating less through 
command and control and more through “regulation and norms.”  In this regard, 
surveillance is not just about the control of mass society, but the creation of 
individuality out of masses—the targeting of people, be it for therapy and 
incarceration or credit, insurance, advertising and sales campaigns.   
Surveillance is a strategic power; it is used for control and discipline.  But it 
also promotes social inclusion--sometimes whether we want it or not.  In extending 
connections beyond physical presence, it enables, in the classic formulation of Georg 
Simmel, a “society of strangers.”11  We interact with others, though we do not know 
them in a direct, face-to-face sense or share with them ties of affinity.  Where we 
know little personal and individual about others, we rely on impersonal data, lots of 
it, which we gather by surveillance.  One might object to the loss of privacy implied 
                                                 
10 Michel Foucault,  Discipline and Punish:  The Birth of the Prison, Alan Sheridan trans., (Pantheon, 
1977),  201. 
11 Georg Simmel, “The Stranger,” in Kurt Wolff (ed.), The Sociology of Georg Simmel (Simon and 
Schuster, 1964).   
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here, but to be excluded from the files of society is even worse.  Few social 
institutions account for illegal immigrants—the “undocumented.”  Lack of 
documentation makes it extremely difficult to obtain work, credit, housing and 
education, in short to participate in society.12  
 
The Production of Surveillance 
Both Giddens and Foucault take account of what can be called the economics 
of surveillance—the cost of getting, recording, classifying, storing and retrieving 
information.  For Giddens, the falling cost of these activities increases the power of 
states to act at a distance and over time—to manage society.  For Foucault 
disciplinary power must be achieved easily and at low cost, so that it may circulate 
widely and continuously.13  It is precisely the nonchalance with which institutions 
operate, automatically, in self regulated fashion, and the ubiquity of discipline that 
distinguishes power in the modern sense from pre-modern forms.  The production 
of surveillance to be pervasive yet unobtrusive, routine and integrated, yet specific 
and discriminating, requires a great deal of machinery and organization. 
The history of writing and printing indicates how difficult it can be to 
assemble this machinery.  Foucault and Giddens both identify writing as a tool for 
administration and control.  But while writing seems fast, efficient and 
transportable, alone it may not increase surveillance.  As Michael Clanchy argues, 
                                                 
12 One should avoid overuse of the word “trust” to describe the inclusive powers of surveillance, for 
trust carries equalitarian connotations, as in the traditional economic thinking about information and 
transparency.  While surveillance permits social interaction among otherwise anonymous or weakly 
linked parties, this does not necessarily mean equality.  A superior can benefit from surveillance in 
monitoring the work of a subordinate, instead of relying on trust. 
13 Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (Pantheon Books, 1984),138. 
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the power of the written word did not lie in the basic “technology” of inscribing, but 
instead required a host of related changes in knowledge and practice before written 
documents were accepted as the definitive source of information.14  It is not enough 
to write things down, moreover.  There must be a fast and efficient way to store and 
retrieve what is written.  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries numerous new 
tools appeared to aide in use of the written word:  indexes, handbooks, codices, 
concordances, glossaries, encyclopedias, standard contracts, account books, 
typewriters, carbon paper and filing cabinets.15  Logs, charts, and tables reduced 
informational costs by permitting functionaries to quickly and consistency supply or 
access data.  Standardized forms (and the all too familiar box to tick) specified the 
data to be collected, reducing the need for skill, expertise and judgment.  Indexing, 
alphabetizing, and pagination assisted in quickly finding the information desired.  
Registers showed the location of records and provided an overview of their 
contents.  By classifying, standardizing and codifying information, it became 
possible to create databases, or useful derivatives of raw information.  By 
establishing protocols for connecting databases, it became possible track people and 
things over distances, across borders and through time using records alone.16  
                                                 
14 Michael Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066 – 1307 (Wiley-Blackwell, 1993).  
With regard to printing, contrast Elizabeth Eisenstein and Adrian Johns.  See Elizabeth Eisenstein, 
“An Unacknowledged Revolution Revisited,”  American Historical Review 107 (February 2002), 87-
105; Adrian Johns, “How to Acknowledge a Revolution,”  American Historical Review 107 (February 
2002), 106-125; Eisenstein, “How to Acknowledge a Revolution:  A Reply,” American Historical 
Review 107 (February 2002), 126-28. 
15 Daniel Headrick, When Information Came of Age:  Technologies of Knowledge in the Age of Reason 
and Revolution, 1700-1850 (Oxford, 2000).  Some of these tools and techniques had existed earlier, 
but the means of representing knowledge were of a new scale. 
16 Pamela Sankar, “State Power and Record-Keeping:  The History of Individualized Surveillance in 
the United States, 1790-1935,”  PhD diss, University of Pennsylvania, 1992, pp. 9-12 
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All of this happened, but it did not happen simply because of literacy or 
printing or any single tool, technology or technique.  Some of the most important 
parts of the machinery of surveillance were the “linking devices” that changed 
accessibility to information already in place.  In the 1890s, James Rand founded a 
company around a system for filing, storing, and retrieving written documents.  He 
sold purpose built cabinets and extensive instruction manuals on the hows and 
whys of good filing.  File cards had been shown superior to bound codices and loose 
papers by Melville Dewey, an advocate of the library card catalogue and inventor of 
the indexing system that bears his name.  Rand’s company merged with Dewey’s 
Library Bureau, providing not only the hardware (cards, cabinets) but software, in 
the form of filing systems, and training in their use.  As JoAnne Yates has shown, an 
industry dedicated to the file and storage of written information emerged.17 
The last half century has added the ability to create, capture and manipulate 
sound, images, and text in digital form—a significant improvement to be sure, but 
not, I would argue, fundamentally out of trend with the previous century.  This is not 
to underestimate the digital revolution, but to emphasize that surveillance requires 
a collection of techniques to work properly.  The extent of surveillance cannot be 
judged by its most sophisticated feature alone. 
Authors Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson believe that we should 
think in terms of a “surveillant assemblage” of heterogeneous objects.  Machines, 
bureaucracies, and categories of knowledge come together to enable surveillance.  
                                                 
17 JoAnne Yates, Control Through Communication:  The Rise of System in American Management (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989).  Also James Beniger, The Control Revolution:  Technological and 
Economic Origins of the Information Society (Harvard University Press, 1986).  For more on Rand and 
his operations, see the collections at the Hagley Museum and Library. 
 11
Thus, to take a contemporary example, cameras on the street, government 
ministries, private security agencies, classifications based on behavior (or ethnic 
and racial profiling), caches of past images, and sorting and matching software are 
all parts of an assemblage that makes Great Britain’s enormous network of security 
cameras possible.18 
In general, an assemblage must perform the following functions if it is to 
enhance surveillance:  identification, memorialization, standardization, and 
classification.  These are the operational protocols, the interfaces that allow 
scattered bits of data about people to gel into representational portraits that can be 
tracked over time and space.  Not just technical matters, they are best seen as the 
social infrastructure of surveillance. 
Unless one person can be distinguished from another—identified--
surveillance has little value, no matter how refined the optic.  If one is observed, but 
not identified, one is in a sense, invisible.  As Foucault puts it, identity creates a “field 
of visibility.”  In a like manner, fixed identity makes tracking by information 
possible.  Most European states began fixing identities in the early modern era, 
taking over these functions from churches, or incorporating parish records into a 
civil system.  By the nineteenth century, many Western nations had worked out 
clear rules and standards for assigning names and addresses.19  Over time the 
number of identifiers has grown.  Passports, fingerprints, social security numbers, 
                                                 
18 Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson “The Surveillant Assemblage,” British Journal of Sociology 
51 (December 2000), 605–622. 
19 Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds., Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State 
Practices in the Modern World (Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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working papers, personnel files, credit histories, bank accounts, property and 
mortgage records all identify.  Universal assignment of social security numbers at 
birth only came about (with much controversy) in the late 1960s in the United 
States.  The social security number quickly became the favorite starting point of the 
identification matrix required for working, owing a home, borrowing money, and 
participating in society in other ways. 
Identification makes us visible, but visibility is of limited significance if the 
information quickly disappears.  Surveillance needs a memory.  Memorialization 
adds the dimension of time to surveillance, building archive that reaches into the 
past and projects into the future.  Early promoters of fingerprinting, for example, 
wanted to construct a record or case file on individuals who ran afoul of the law.  
Such record keeping was central to their project of policing society--either by 
reforming criminals through careful attention to their case histories, or by 
incarcerating repeat offenders for longer and longer periods of time.  Fingerprints 
both identified subjects and left a record that could be checked in the future. 
The epitome of memorialization in the bureaucracy of surveillance is the 
dossier.  In simplest terms, a dossier is a bundle of papers or documents with a label.  
The power of the dossier derives from its heterogeneous nature—it may contain 
anything one wants to know of a subject.  This also makes it unwieldy to use, but 
what the dossier lacks in facility it makes up for with completeness.  Presumably 
almost anything about a life could be reconstructed if the dossier were thick enough.   
It is not necessary, though, that files grow thicker in one central place for 
memory to operate.  Dispersal can have the same effect—protecting memory by 
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keeping information in different places.  Over the past fifty years, the cost of 
dispersing information—in essence communications—has gone down dramatically.  
To take one striking example, a “fact” about a person, truthful or not, that makes its 
way on to the internet may never be erased, as it is repeated in website after 
website, turning up in search after search. 
At their most advanced, files are easily accessed, well maintained and up-to-
date.  When names and addresses existed only in parish baptismal files, they had 
little surveillance value.  Even if these records established identities, they could not 
be easily accessed, and they were not updated.  Thus name changes or movement 
away from place of birth threw a cloak of invisibility over subjects.  One of the first 
things that states seeking greater knowledge over people did was to centralize files 
and issue identification papers that had to be updated or filed again after every 
move.20     
Even when people carry fixed identities and have up-to-date files, the gears 
of surveillance can slip, the wheels bog down.  The more information that is 
available, the more difficult it may be to retrieve what is desired, to sort the useful 
and valuable from the irrelevant.  When files about people exist, but cannot be 
located or are expensive to call up, then people once again become invisible to those 
seeking to follow and monitor them.  Standardization and categorization help to 
overcome the problem of information overload.   
                                                 
20 For examples, see Caplan and Torpey, Documenting Individual Identity, “Part One: Creating 
Apparatus of Identification.” 
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Bureaucracies work by enacting a set of relatively simple and repeatable 
rules and routines.  Much as we hate red tape, far worse is a bureaucracy where the 
rules are uncertain, the routines missing.  Picture yourself standing in line at your 
local department of motor vehicles.  Now picture yourself there with no clear rules 
for obtaining your license, no form to fill out, indeed, no lines for queuing.  The 
infamous standardized forms that are the depressingly common feature of any 
bureaucratic experience—in the hospital, in school, or at work—are ways of 
extracting and standardizing information.21 
Standards structure data, separating the signal from the noise, or more 
exactly, determining what is signal, what noise.  In the same way they render us 
visible and tractable subjects when used in the context of surveillance.  When we 
give answers to questions on the form, we come under the scrutiny of those who 
wrote the questions and designed the form.  We become visible to them by our 
answers.  Even failure to answer puts us under the light, for we become an anomaly, 
standing out from the crowd.  In either case, we reveal ourselves in ways useful to 
those seeking to know.  
The final piece of the social infrastructure of surveillance is classification.  
Like standardization, classification structures data.  It acts as a grid “that transforms 
undifferentiated behavior into appropriable artifacts, or information.”22  In policing 
the extreme example is racial or ethnic profiling.  But even the division of people for 
more benign purposes enacts a classification scheme:  the targeting of social groups 
                                                 
21 On a related matter, see Atul Gawande, “The Checklist,” The New Yorker, December 10, 2007. 
22 Sankar, “State Power and Record Keeping,”  p. 79. 
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by advertisers, the division of the credit market into high and low risk segments.  By 
the grid of classification we are known and seen.23 
These social tools of surveillance multiply the power of any one surveillant 
technique.  Without identification, it becomes difficult to link information to 
subjects, no matter how powerful the processing device.  Without a dossier, 
information exists only in the immediate present.  Without standardization and 
classification it is hard to know who should be observed (making observation 
expensive) or what should be done with the information obtained.  
Interlocking social, intellectual and physical apparatus also gives surveillance 
a momentum.  The more that life entails production of personal documentation, the 
more artifacts there are to operate on.  Imaginative administrators of organizations 
are constantly seeking new uses for personal data in ways that extend what they can 
know and see.24  The resulting system of surveillance is not nearly so top down as 
those imagined in classic stories about totalitarianism.  Orwell’s 1984 is rooted in 
the technology of the World War II era—a telescreen run by a central government 
bureaucracy.  Today’s assemblages cut across the private and public sectors, and 
survey many aspects of behavior, but only at certain times.  Despite the density of 
the network, one comes under its gaze only at fleeting moments.  The very flexible, 
heterogeneous nature of an assemblage, however, means that it can grow and 
branch in ways not totally planned or predicted. 
                                                 
23 Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences  
(MIT Press, 1999).  Beniger, The Control Revolution, 16, makes a similar point about governing 
“people as things,” is a way to reduce the information needed to control them. 
24 James B. Rule, Douglas McAdam, Linda Stearns, and David Uglow, “ Documentary Identification and 
Mass Surveillance in the United States,” Social Problems  31 (December, 1983), 222-234. 
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This sort of unplanned (in the top down sense) surveillance growth took 
place in the United States in the 1970s.  Government agencies added new computer 
functionality to their mainframes, which had been installed earlier to take care of 
routine, but labor intensive record keeping and accounting tasks.  Motivated by a 
combination of executive branch initiatives and inner bureaucratic decisions, 
agencies began to share and link files.  Their initial thought was to improve services 
to their clients--recipients of social security, welfare, or veterans benefits.  The 
linking, however, provoked an unexpected backlash—it was the era of Watergate--
and prompted federal investigations into the question of privacy.  Eventually, in 
1974, Congress passed the Privacy Act, designed to rein in government surveillance.  
But the law did little to stop the linking and matching of files, as agencies simply 
made it a matter of internal policy to share data with each other.  Short of continual 
oversight of routine operations, it is extremely difficult for law and legislation to 
check this sort of bureaucratic surveillance, when the technology and operations are 
built right into the organizational structure.25  The whole episode also shows how 
even when the manifest purpose of an information technology is narrow, it can have 
latent potential that managers will capitalize on when they seek to maximize the 
efficiency and utility of expensive equipment. 
 
Privacy and The Costs of Surveillance 
                                                 
25The records of the U.S. Privacy Commission hearings can be found in the Willis Ware Collection, 
Charges Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.  In subsequent investigations 
of private surveillance, the Commission determined that no further legal protection of privacy was 
warranted, although private organizations had begun using the same techniques. 
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In one regard, surveillance is like any other product or service:  it has costs 
and it yields benefits.  But just as some goods have external effects that harm the 
natural environment, so surveillance spins off externalities that degrade the social 
environment.  A full accounting of surveillance should include the costs borne by 
those from whom information is taken.   
The economics of information acknowledges some production costs.  They 
are internalized when information is treated as property, protected by patents and 
copyrights.  But surveillance does not generally involve matters of intellectual 
property.  Although forms of information may be owned (recordings, databanks, 
graphics, novels), information about oneself generally is not protected, or is 
protected only in specific instances.26  Photographers may not sell your picture 
without your say-so, but anyone can mine public data to gather information about 
your address, your car registration, your date of birth, your marital status, and the 
like.  The fact that this information is about you does not give you a right of property 
over it.  Financial data enjoys greater protection, but applying for a loan, using a 
credit card or obtaining a mortgage enters your information into the credit 
surveillance network, which largely works by sharing data across different 
institutions:  from banks to credit card companies, to credit reporting bureaus, to 
insurance firms.  Although this information intercourse is not frictionless—there are 
certain requirements of consent, possibly certain privacy laws to negotiate—
                                                 
26 In 1896, the courts ruled that compiled information belongs to sellers not buyers or subjects.  Ladd 
v. Oxnard, 75 Federal Reporter 703. 
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participation in the economy at all but the cash level generally requires that one give 
consent early and often. 
The discreet bits of information themselves are less the issue than the ability 
to combine and connect them to form new information.  Privacy laws are weakest 
here, particularly when private information given by consent is matched to publicly 
available data for which no consent is necessary.  Information so gathered, stored, 
and manipulated may be used in decisions about loans, to design marketing and 
advertising campaigns, in background checks for employment.  Although the data 
may have been obtained freely, once it is structured for these purposes, it can be 
deemed proprietary and hence protected by law.    
All this, according to Richard Posner, is largely a good thing.  Privacy in the 
economic sense, he argues, is concealment of information.  When information is 
withheld or concealed, people act opportunistically or fraudulently, undermining 
contracts and inhibiting the workings of the market.  By this logic surveillance, 
which increases the circulation of information about people, yields greater 
transparency and reduces risk, promoting market exchange.27   
Posner’s argument rests on the traditional assumptions about information.  
More information is good, thus anyone seeking to restrict information must be 
doing something bad.  He overlooks the strategic nature of surveillance.  Though 
opportunism may result when someone restricts information about his or her 
intentions, as argued above it may also arise when one party has thoroughly 
                                                 
27 Richard A. Posner, “The Economics of Privacy,” The American Economic Review, 71 No. 2, Papers 
and Proceedings of the Ninety-Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 
1981), 405-409. 
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surveyed the other, and obtained an informational advantage.  Seen in this light, 
privacy may maintain rather than break information symmetry and promote rather 
than subvert fairness in market exchange. 
Those who see no problem with increased surveillance also tend to ignore 
the costs borne by those surveilled.  Consider mistakes, or inaccurate information.  
The surveiller or the surveillee (or both) may suffer the consequences of bad 
information, as for example in denying credit to someone who should have received 
it.  But who pays for correcting errors—for verification?  In theory, firms should 
have incentive to avoid mistakes and perform verification, since they bear some of 
the direct costs of misinformation, in the form of Type I or Type II errors.  But their 
stake in accuracy is limited to the cost of a mistake in a discreet transaction.  It thus 
may actually be less expensive for them to suffer individual mistakes than to verify 
every case.  The falling cost of data processing increases a firm’s client population, 
and hence reduces the weight of any one error in the portfolio.  With a sufficiently 
large population, errors will be randomly distributed.  For subjects, on the other 
hand, costs extend beyond a single transaction.  The falsehood lodges in their 
surveillance dossier and follows them onward.  They suffer reputational damage.     
The past fifty years have seen tremendous decreases in the cost of 
information processing, but has there been equal progress in verification?  There is 
reason to believe not.  Much verification has to be done case by case—the 
exceptions, not the mass processed rule.  Verification also raises thorny 
epistemological issues.  If your initial observation was wrong, how many more 
observations should you make to be sure you are right?  Uncertainty is particularly 
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bedeviling when information and verification of information comes through the 
sharing of files among organizations—banks, credit card companies, credit 
reporting bureaus—which employ different standards.28 
Damage to reputation attaches to the individual, but there are also social 
costs of surveillance  The Panopticon, recall, was powerful not because one was 
constantly under scrutiny, but because one never knew.  In a like manner, Orwell 
reckoned the power of the Thought Police derived from the population’s fear that 
every word, deed, idea and feeling would be known.  As he brilliantly observed, one 
had to work hard to avoid Thought Crime by suppressing logic, missing obvious 
analogies, and avoiding clear evidence.  Without privacy, one lives in a state of 
insecurity, a condition oppressive to the individual, but destructive of social capital 
more broadly. 
The danger to social life from surveillance was recognized by the end of the 
nineteenth century, as new, more powerful techniques of observation and recording 
emerged.  Under the influence of Louis Brandeis, privacy shifted from protection of 
property and assets to protection of the social environment. 
Changes in the technology of surveillance motivated Brandeis’s 1890 
Harvard Law Review essay “The Right to Privacy,” penned with his law partner 
                                                 
28 One way of mitigating the externalities of surveillance, it might be argued, lies in compensating 
those to whom harm is done.  Remedy would be found in tort law, the protection of one’s reputation 
as a valuable asset. Courts are an expensive and cumbersome way to correct misinformation and 
protect reputations, however, and given these costs only the wealthy are in a position to use them.  
To the extent that reputation has an economic value—and hence the damages against reputation can 
be measured in financial terms—the poor or less than famous are unlikely to reap much of financial 
compensation even if victorious at trial. 
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Samuel Warren. 29 The immediate influence on their work was the shabby exposure 
of Warren’s personal life in the press.  Mass circulation newspapers, enabled by 
reductions in printing costs with rotary steam presses and new typesetting 
machines, quickly took advantage of other innovations, notably photography, 
photoengraving and telegraphy, to bring scenes of everyday life into the homes of 
more people than ever before.  Cheap printing of newspapers, electrical 
transmission of the news, national wire services, and easy reproduction of 
photographs made the printed news an item of mass consumption on a national 
scale.  The penny press relied on a large circulation, appealing to the widest 
audience, using the juiciest stories to attract an avid readership, which provided the 
basis for high advertising revenues.  Competition among big city dailies motivated 
newspapers to display all sorts of details about people's lives.  Fast, cheap and 
efficient methods of communications assured that much of the nation would hear 
about it.  Of course, the surveillance net cast by newspapers was selective--only 
certain details of certain lives in certain circumstances merited attention.  Only the 
things that would help to sell papers.  A murder or sex scandal yes, a mundane event 
in the life of an average soul, no.  But for those details that fit the mesh of 
surveillance, newspapers, photographs and related apparatus sent information 
traveling farther and wider than gossips ever had. 
Leaving aside any direct economic loss suffered by victims of unwanted 
attention, Brandeis argued that people had a right to their thoughts, feelings, 
                                                 
29 On the history of this famous document see “The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America,” 
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 94, No. 8. (June, 1981), 1892-1910. 
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sentiments, and emotions.  The powerful machinery of the press collapsed the space 
for quite repose and reflection.  There might be nothing new about gossip, but its 
speed, scale and intensity through the circulation of publicity had deep social 
consequences.  It “lower[s] social standards…belittles and perverts...by inverting the 
relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a 
people.  No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its 
blighting influence.”30  Surveillance in modern life, driven by not just technology but 
the economics of large scale production, degraded the public sphere and threatened 
civic life.  It took away the possibility of secure interaction among people who knew 
and trusted each other—Brandeis’s cherished alternative to the modern world of 
mass society and large scale production.31  
Despite Brandeis’s efforts to calibrate a new right of privacy for the age of 
publicity, law has proved a weak barrier against the tidal surge of surveillance.  
Even today, it is the sand in the gears of the system that limits surveillance’s social 
and personal costs.  We live in a moment of grace from total surveillance because 
the cost of collecting data has fallen faster than the cost of sorting it out.  This 
imbalance creates a fragile bubble of anonymity. 
The history of information processing suggests that if inefficiency is 
protecting privacy, privacy will not be long for this world.  Inventors and users of 
data have strong incentive to develop techniques that lower not just the collecting 
                                                 
30 Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV, No. 5 
(December 15, 1890), 193-220, quoted at p. 196. 
31 Gerald Berk, “Whose Hubris?  Brandeis, Scientific Management and the Railroads,” in Kenneth 
Lipartito and David Sicilia, eds., Constructing Corporate America:  History, Politics, Culture (Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 120-146. 
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costs, but the storing, sorting and using costs of information as well.  This includes 
resistance by those from whom information is collected.  As Foucault presciently 
observed, surveillance is most powerful when it is simple, ordinary and unobtrusive.  
Large and obvious methods of gathering information draw the most fire from critics, 
creating incentives for the production of small and obscure methods.  
 
Surveillance, Privacy and Credit 
All these tendencies in the history of marketplace surveillance are clear in 
the example of credit reporting.  Credit agencies today maintain perhaps the most 
extensive private files on the lives of ordinary people.  They manage a mesh of 
surveillance that touches almost all aspects of our economic lives.  As a case study of 
how economic surveillance grows, credit reporting is particularly illuminating for 
two reasons.  First, it follows the process of spatial expansion, which as Giddens 
notes is often the motive behind surveillance.  Secondly, it shows that while 
surveillance collects information, it does not promote in any simple sense 
objectivity, rationality or transparency. 
The word credit comes from the Latin for trust.  Trust is often based on 
complex webs of social relations:  blood ties, religious affinity, ethnic identity, 
community solidarity.  But surveillance extends itself because these traditional ties 
are no longer adequate, or at least must be supplemented to deal with the increased 
speed, complexity and geographical extent of economic relationships.  While some 
have argued that credit reporting renegotiates trust in an impersonal world, I would 
argue that it replaces the emotional connections that once bound people in relations 
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of trust with a putatively rational means of calculating risk.  Such calculation 
depends heavily on surveillance, or the ability to penetrate the mind of others and 
make their behavior predictable and governable.  It is a form of control, not a 
measure of trust. 
In the United States, credit reporting first appeared in the 1840s, a moment 
of market growth and expansion.  In the nineteenth century (and until the 1970s) 
agencies used investigation to verify character and regulate the extension of capital.  
Agents sought out information on those seeking money and wrote reports that were 
sold to merchants, bankers and other would-be lenders.  Early credit agencies, 
however, did not so much replace traditional ethnic, family and community methods 
of establishing trust, as build off of them.32  Indeed, as Scott Sandage has noted, 
nineteenth century credit reports frequently did little more than codify gossip and 
repeat stereotypes and clichés.33  A typical negative report from the 19th century 
might read “drunk and of no account.”  This was easily understood as “you do not 
want to lend money to this person.”  Why bother with euphemisms when the object 
to was give the lender the same sense of the person they might form if they had met 
them face to face?  Even positive reports mapped the stereotypes of the time.  One 
credit agent from New Orleans entered this in his report about a partnership of two 
                                                 
32 The connection between local culture and the systematic methods of credit bureaus is made by 
Rowena Olegario, A Culture of Credit: Embedding Trust and Transparency in American Business. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 119-138. 
33 Scott Sandage,  Born Losers:  A History of Failure in America (Harvard University Press, 2005). 
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Jewish brothers:  “Both are Jews, keen & wide awake (as much so as any other two 
of that mysterious people that the sunlight has ever shown upon.)”34 
Still, if the reports themselves did not offer content or comment that was 
particularly new or innovative, collectively they fed into a reporting apparatus that 
presented this old content in ways accessible to those living far from potential 
borrowers (or living in different social contexts). Their value came in the 
arrangement of information in a centralized set of books or ledgers with 
standardized protocols for use and access.  Organization transformed local gossip 
and prejudice into systematized intelligence.  Gradually, credit reporting established 
correlations between observed behavior or traits and likelihood of repayment. 
People of the time quickly realized that this new organization of knowledge 
marked a departure from traditional social relations.  They saw not trust but an 
“American Inquisition.”  Hunt’s Merchant’s Magazine warned the public, “A thousand 
folios include a page or two or more about you and your affairs, without your 
knowledge or your consent.  Go where you may to purchase goods, a character has 
preceded you, either for your benefit or your destruction.”35  Critics lambasted the 
‘diabolical Jesuitism” of  a system that inquired into “the associations, the business, 
the family, and the personal habits of every man engaged in trade.”36  Others 
                                                 
34 Quoted in Rowena Olegario, "That Mysterious People": Jewish Merchants, Transparency, and 
Community in Mid-Nineteenth Century America,  Business History Review, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Summer, 
1999), 161-189. 
35 Hunt’s Merchant’s Magazine and Commercial Review (New York), 1853, quoted in Josh Lauer, “From 
Rumor to Written Record: Credit Reporting and the Invention of Financial Identity in Nineteenth-
Century America,” Technology and Culture 49 (April, 2008), 301-24. 
36 George G. Foster, New York Naked (New York: DeWitt & Davenport, [185?]), 119, quoted in Lauer, 
“From Rumor to Written Record.”  
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bemoaned the lack of safeguards for accuracy and the high likelihood of 
incompetence by poorly paid agents.   
Supporters countered that honest businesspeople had nothing to fear, 
employing the time honored justification of surveillance that sweeps up the 
innocent and guilty alike.  The founder of the first American credit bureau, Lewis 
Tappan, argued that he was simply doing the same thing “as merchants usually 
employ—only on an extended plan—to ascertain whether persons applying for 
credit are worthy of the same and to what extent.”37  It was, however, the extension 
and systematization that made all the difference.  Herein lay the most profound 
criticism—not that the information was incorrect, but that it established a single 
national standard of behavior, ignoring the complexity of local conditions.  How, 
skeptics wondered, could a single system “be devised . . . to overcome, or accurately 
anticipate, conditions and circumstances so complex and variable?”38  The answer 
was that credit reporting determined what counted and why.  It did not extend the 
lines of trust based on first hand knowledge and experience—a personal 
relationship—but rather instituted a system of monitoring and control that 
standardized and regularized behavior.  The power of inscribing and interpreting 
lay with the surveillers, whose level of information grew relative to the surveilled.39 
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38 Thomas F. Meagher, The Commercial Agency “System” of the United States and Canada Exposed 
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Reform of credit reporting did not focus on issues of strategy and power, 
however, but rather aimed to promote greater accuracy, fairness and objectivity.  In 
one sense, of course, this was just.  Through the 1960s and 70s credit investigators 
continued to construct their files through investigation, routinely questioning 
landlords about the drinking (or drug use) habits of young men with long hair, or 
asking neighbors about the private lives of women who had male guests in their 
rooms.40  A few nosy neighbors might be enough to get a credit card revoked, an 
insurance policy cancelled.  Such subjectivity came in for strong criticism.  Women 
denied credit because they lacked work histories or were presumed to be 
dependents of their husbands, and African Americans suffering prejudices about 
their character spurred legislation in the 1970s aimed at fair and open credit. 
Credit agencies responded by emphasizing the objective nature of 
information derived from computer databases.  By the mid 1970s, credit reporting 
relied far less on character or background and almost completely on a pattern of life 
revealed by one’s transactions history.  Computers and communications 
technologies were making it possible to collect more information on more people 
from more places than ever before.  Banks and credit card companies used these 
early computer networks to keep track of their customers’ financial records and 
verify charges.  Such data, in machine readable form, was soon being used by new 
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“automatic” or computer and statistics based credit agencies, such as Retail Credit 
Corporation (today Equifax), and other companies that would grow into its 
competitors, Transunion and Experian.41  These credit agencies in turn benefited 
from the criticism directed at traditional investigative or “gumshoe” operations, 
which reported local prejudice and gossip into their files.  The information that 
determined risk was now strictly behavioral:  one’s pattern of financial activity, 
updated on a daily, even hourly basis, rather than some stable, if highly subjective 
notion of character and worth. 
 As the history of credit reporting shows, the answer to criticisms of 
surveillance has frequently been, more surveillance.  Or a different form of 
surveillance.  When fair credit laws undermined traditional evaluation practices, 
companies moved to their new, impersonal systems.  When laws banned the use of 
race and gender, other categories were deployed to regulate credit.  But credit based 
on a pattern of transactions, continually updated by the latest data from credit card 
companies, banks and the like, also set up a much denser and more extensive 
network of surveillance.   
The new credit surveillance did not, as supporters claimed, produce pure, 
uninflected information either.  To operate, surveillance always needs a grid or 
frame with which to filter information.  If it is not drinking habits, hair length, 
religion, race or gender, it must be something else:  payment history, use and 
amount of available credit, number of loans.  One becomes known through one’s 
place in a grid of behavioral categories.  Once the predictive quality of such 
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Commission Hearings, Willis Ware Collection, Charles Babbage Institute. 
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categories has been established, they become hard to escape and nearly invisible as 
devices of social regulation. 
For example, when race was considered a legitimate category for making 
insurance and lending decisions, African Americans were shunted into less desirable 
housing and had more difficulty securing loans.  The elimination of race from the 
surface of credit reporting did not mean that race disappeared, however, only that it 
was submerged into other categories.42  Decisions about credit, insurance and 
mortgages made through complex algorithms still included categories that 
correlated with race, such as address, income level, existing credit level, or past 
financial behavior.  Yet race itself never appeared in the new models, making it 
actually harder to eliminate from decisions.  When the old, subjective models took 
race and other social variables explicitly into account the effects of prejudice were 
obvious.  The new models offered a pretence of objectivity that nonetheless mapped 
all sorts of hidden social categories.  In the end, surveillance has no value if it cannot 
discriminate or aid decision making in some way. 
 
Surveillance and the Information Economy 
Surveillance is integral to the modern economy.  It appears most prominently 
in the most informationally rich sectors, such as banking, insurance, and advertising, 
or among the most information intensive business functions—financing, accounting, 
comptrolling, marketing.  In fact, if firms are conceived of as organizations for 
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Harvard University, 2007.  
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processing and circulating information, surveillance inheres in the very constitution 
of the corporation.  Decentralized managerial structures break down tasks to 
measurable, calculable units, thus permitting executives to monitor performance 
and assign responsibility for outcomes to individuals—the heads of the divisions.43 
The lean production methods developed in Japan and transferred around the world 
increased efficiency by continually identifying and eliminating slack in the system—
a better means of surveillance on the line.44   
Recent attempts to rethink organizational structures in the age of 
information sometimes miss or obscure the crucial role of surveillance.  For 
example, in one of the most sweeping statements about the implications of a “post 
modern, post Fordist” world dominated by information, Manuel Castells predicts an 
end to centralized bureaucracy and the liberation of workers from dull, supervised 
routine.  The new network technology, Castells writes, eliminates the drudgery and 
leaves only the work that requires “analysis, decision and reprogramming 
capabilities in real time…”45  It is not clear, however, that any of this means less 
surveillance.  “Worker empowerment” rests on information systems that give 
managers tremendous knowledge of what each worker is doing at each moment of 
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the day.  One is empowered to act precisely because what one does can be instantly 
assessed.46  Creating a global culture that can be accessed by global corporations 
requires the sort of penetration into everyday life on a global scale that Giddens 
argues took place on a national scale in the age of the nation state.  This is not a 
bureaucracy-free utopia, but a new modality of the modern system of control and 
calculation that emerged two centuries ago. 
Conclusion 
Economies may run on information, but as the study of surveillance shows, 
we only get information through the tools and methods we construct ourselves.  
Information may reduce uncertainty, but there is no certain way to know how good 
our information is, a tension that prompts still more surveillance.  The result is what 
might be termed the epistemological conundrum of the market.  How do we know 
when we know enough?  
In theory surveillance should follow the same economic laws as operate for 
other resources:  at some point the cost of knowing exceeds its value.  Historically, 
however, forces have conspired to push the cost of knowing quite low.  Better 
technology, ineffective privacy laws, no ownership rights in one’s personal data, and 
plenty of free public information--free information that can be made proprietary 
once it is encoded in a database--all lower the cost of knowing.  Meanwhile, demand 
is driven by the unceasing tensions of uncertainty.  With the cost of supplying 
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surveillance falling and demand potentially unlimited, the economy of surveillance 
will yield more and more surveillance. 
Modern societies have a strong tendency to push personal space and privacy 
to the margins in their obsession with reducing risks, rooting out uncertainty, and 
verifying every act.  Theories of information which hold that more information 
promotes rational decision making and transparency provide intellectual support 
for this tendency.  The proposition that we might be better off by giving up trying to 
know more is a difficult one for intellectuals to accept.  What are the consequences if 
we do not yield, if we let surveillance grow of its own accord?  Leave aside for now 
the political dangers of a state with limitless access to our personal information, 
considerable though these are.  Turn instead to the externalities of information 
gathering, to the uncounted social costs of the technology of surveillance. 
Recall that a prime costs of information is storage and retrieval.  One sees, 
observes and senses all sorts of things all the time but little of this is remembered, 
and of what is remembered, even less is used.  No matter how delicate the sensory 
mechanism, no matter how powerful the information processing, it is impossible to 
eliminate the opportunity cost of attention.  Beyond a certain point, there is simply 
too much to notice, too much to attend to.  Here is where surveillance operates, by 
imposing an order, grid or classification scheme to sort the interesting from the 
irrelevant.  Surveillance calls attention to some things by ignoring others.  Although 
this clarifies our attention by separating the noise from the signal, it does not 
produce transparency, commonly understood as a clear window on reality.  As 
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philosopher Alfred North Whitehead warned, "there is a danger in clarity, the 
danger of overlooking the subtleties of truth." 
Like any complex system, the technology of surveillance may fail to tell us 
what we need to know, even when operating according to specifications.  Two 
decades ago, sociologist Charles Perrow warned that complex systems, no matter 
how well designed, will predictably fail, though at unpredictable moments--what he 
termed “normal accidents.”47  They fail from conditions or interactions that could 
not be anticipated during the design phase.  It is impossible to head off these failures 
because we only get from the system the information it was designed to yield.  This 
leaves us blind when the unanticipated occurs.  We cannot see beyond the controls 
to the complex reality they are meant to represent.  Attempts to correct the 
problem, to reduce risk and uncertainty through better surveillance, are futile.  The 
information we use to see and monitor is derived from the system components 
themselves. 
In this vein, we might ask, is today’s credit market meltdown due to a failure 
of oversight and surveillance, or is it the unbidden but predictable result of 
surveillance?  Better capital market optics allowed lenders to extend credit and 
capital to more people in more ways than ever before.  Doing so also connected and 
synchronized markets though the spread of information techniques and financial 
algorithms.  Using tools of surveillance, financiers were able to build a bigger, more 
complex, and more fragile system, exactly the conditions that Perrow warns will 
lead to unanticipated catastrophe.  
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This is one danger of surveillance—a clarity that hides the subtleties of truth.  
A second has to do with the link between knowledge and power.  Surveillance, as I 
have noted, is not bilateral, but strategic:  the collection and deployment of 
information by one party against another.  The response to strategic uses of 
information is frequently to increase surveillance all around.  If the mortgage 
market collapses through vendor opportunism or if companies like Enron are able 
to hide their operations behind a thicket of misinformation, then we automatically 
assume that greater surveillance and accountability are called for.  This impulse 
feeds the surveillant assemblage, but by enabling further surveillance, it also creates 
opportunities down the road for yet more strategic behavior.  Someone structures 
the surveillance system, and someone in turn is placed under surveillance.  Each 
party has an interest in what is revealed, and each has incentive to focus the optic in 
ways that suit its interests. 
It is tempting to think we will surmount these problems with better data and 
more sophisticated monitoring techniques.  But trying to escape the informational 
black hole with raw surveillance power would only send us around the same loop.  
And it would rapidly degrade the social environment.  As surveillance critic Philip 
Agre argues, too much information drawing people too close together stifles 
diversity—essentially the criticism directed at the inquisitorial aspects of credit 
reporting a century ago.48  As the grid of surveillance draws tight, one must account 
for each and every action   Take this far enough and we will be issuing quarterly 
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reports on our own lives.  In such an environment—the economic equivalent of 
1984—opportunities for originality and innovation would cease.  Anything outside 
the grid, anything that could not be accounted for, would be deemed illegitimate and 
ruthlessly eliminated.   
Surveillance makes life more predictable and calculable.  It synchronizes 
behavior and provides a platform for social interaction in a modern, anonymous 
world.  These are useful things, but the belief that ever more surveillance can 
overcome the incompleteness of information or the partiality of abstraction is a 
dangerous delusion.  It will only shut us out of what Agre calls “the radical 
strangeness and challenge of the real world.”  And it will lead to the sort of system 
breakdowns and strategic opportunism that are entirely to be expected in a world 
awash in too much information. 
